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Court of Appeals Review of
Administrative Law Judges'
Findings and Opinions'
PatriciaM. Wald2
It is a unique pleasure to address administrative law judges (AlLs). I
think of ALJs as being "present at the creation" of most of the cases that
eventually wind their way to the D.C. Circuit. In fact, in the most recent
year for which statistics are available, well over half the cases in our circuit
came directly from the agencies, 3 and in a large number of those an AJ
made the initial decision. And while you launch these cases, we represent
the end of the road for most of those same litigants: even in our worst year,
the Supreme Court took up fewer than one percent of our cases. So
between us, we control a good bit of the administrative process.
In my heart of hearts, I think that you have the more important role.
You, with the help of counsel, define the issues, lay down the law at least
preliminarily, and, most important, make the findings of fact that drive
the rest of the process. I may be prejudiced in this vein. I started my career
as a law clerk to Judge Jerome Frank of the Second Circuit, a "legal realist"
whose course at Yale Law School was titled "Fact Finding." Judge Frank
stoutly maintained that whoever found the facts controlled the outcome
of the case. On reflection some thirty-five years later, I think he was
probably right.
It is also interesting to me that what administrative law cognoscenti
have recognized up to now as the de facto power of a factfinder increasingly is being translated into de jure power. More and more proposals for
administrative change are coming down the pike, including, for example,
the creation of new article Icourts for veterans'claims 4 and proposals to
do the same for social security claims. 5 Many of these proposals would
make the Alis' factual determinations conclusive or reviewable only for
the most egregious errors. 6 So yours is a growth stock. This consensus in
1 This article was originally given as a speech at the Federal Administrative Law
Judges' Conference in Washington, D.C. on November 18, 1988, and was first published
under the title, "Some Thoughts on Beginnings andEnds," 67 Wash. L.Q.R. 661 (1989). It

is reprinted here with permission.
2 Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
3 1988 Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Court Management
Statistics 2 (twelve-month period ended June 30, 1988).
4 Congress recently enacted the Veterans' Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687,
§ 301, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988) (to be codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4051-4092), which created a
new United States Court of Veterans Appeals under article I of the Constitution.
5 See Court Idea Revived, Nat'l. L.J., March 24, 1986, at 2 (reporting a proposal for
the creation of a new, specialized article I court to deal with disability and other social
security claims).
6 These proposals would move the agency adjudication process in the direction of the
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favor of more power in the factfinder comes, perhaps ironically for us
court of appeals judges, at a time when there are loud, even strident, calls
for judicial restraint on the part of article III judges-demands that we
interfere less in the agencies' business and stop second guessing their
judgment calls.
It is an interesting dichotomy, but I would guess that your ascendant
power is an inevitable phenomenon. So long as agencies handle more and
more disputes between citizens and their government in more and more
specialized subject matter areas as I think that they will-notwithstanding
the occasional campaign rhetoric to the contrary-and so long as there is
a simultaneous reluctance to increase the numbers of article III judges
indefinitely, more power is going to be lodged at your level. There is
general agreement among article III judges that we do not want to grow
in numbers. I have just come from a historic gathering (the first in 200
years) of all the federal courts of appeals judges in the nation, and that is
the definite consensus: we don't want our group to get much bigger. That
means, then, that proposals to limit our scope of review, particularly in
the factfinding area, will be considered carefully. So your star is on the
rise, and, if ours is not on the wane, it is at least fixed for a time.
I do not need to tell you that with any power surge comes increased
responsibility. ALJs, not appellate court judges, are likely to become the
court of last resort for many more litigants. In that context, maintaining
your independence and integrity becomes ever more critical. And that is
not always easy. You, in contrast to us, do not have life tenure and your
duties and assignments may be changed at the behest of the agency. Thus,
I believe that ongoing efforts by ALJs to distance yourselves from specific
agency sponsors, and to build a reputation and a reality of professionalism
and independence, are tremendously important to the future of administrative law as a whole. Only an impressive track record will convince a
disgruntled citizen that an umpire hired by the agency is really going to
give her a square deal. 7 And, of course, it is hard to work in and for an
agency and not be subtly affected by its priorities and even prejudices.
The ALJ has to enforce the law pretty much as laid down by the agency
and the courts. But when the goals of the agency drive hard in one
direction, it takes courage and intellectual discipline to find the facts
impartially if they point to a result in the other direction. Yet that is
precisely what ALJs must do now and with even more frequency in the
future.
model established under the federal child labor laws, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 212, 216(e)
(1982), where the ALT's decision is the final-e.g., unreviewable-action within the
Department of Labor. See generally Cass, Allocation of Authority within Bureaucracies:
EmpiricalEvidence aidNornativeAnalysis 66 B.U.L. Rev. 1, 10-14 & n.48 (1986).
7 For a recent example of the skepticism that ALJs must confront regularly, see Tolchin,
Are Judge andAgency Too Close for Justice?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1988, §4 at 2, col. 3.

Review of ALJ Findings
Moreover, the smaller the claim and the more insignificant the
claimant, the greater the AL's responsibility is. I do not, for instance,
envy the ALIs in the social security disability and labor law fields, or the
immigration officers at the Department of Justice. Their caseloads are
staggering; the policymakers cannot help but think in terms of missions,
priorities, numbers, and even occasionally dollar signs. Yet, in such areas
the ALJs must play God. Their conscience and professionalism are often
their only guide. At every important juncture in our history and at every
level of adjudication, truly independent judges have courted rejection,
calumny, and misunderstanding by their bosses and even the public. We
all feel occasionally like the spy who wants to come in from the cold and
enjoy the approbation of going with the flow. But resisting such temptations is, in the final analysis, what judging is all about. Enough said-I
know I preach to the converted. You ALJs are the real freedom fighters in
my book, and I only wish the national budget reflected that truth.
I do wonder, however, for the future of your corps if we -the
government as a whole-pay as much attention to many factors in AJ
selection as we should. We commonly seek to ensure that a candidate
possesses such qualities as intellectual acumen and acquired expertise, but
we might probe more deeply into a potential AU's judicial temperament,
lack of bias, impartiality, signs of courage and integrity in his or her past
history, and willingness to take principled stands against the mainstream
when necessary. Agood civil servant does not automatically make a good
AJ. ALJ positions should not be rewards for good soldiering on the
agency's behalf. The Europeans may have a leg up on us in designing
career ladders for their judges that include stints in the government
bureaus as hearing officers, and that provide for upward mobility from
there into the civil courts.
Our tradition of appointing article III judges is a much different one,
relying more heavily on political factors and philosophical congruence
with the administration in power. But the intransigence of that tradition
should not prevent us from looking hard at our selection processes for
AUs, especially as they assume ever more critical functions in our
decisional processes. For instance, I was shocked to learn of the low
percentage of women who have been appointed ALs: as of September
1988, only 4.1% of federal administrative law judges were women. I am
equally disturbed by the low representation of minorities in the AU ranks:
approximately 94% of ALas are white. a Certainly the same needs for
diversity and representativeness among judges applies at the ALJ level as
at the appellate court judge level. Both of our benches dispense justice to
all segments of the population, and our composite profiles ought to send
8 These figures were obtained from the Office of Administrative Law Judges in the
Office of Personnel Management, Washington, D.C., and are current as of September 1988.
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the message that our ranks are open to everyone of ability. It is a goal for
which all of us should be fighting together.
On another front, I am glad to see over the years the greater integration
of ALJs into our judges' professional groups: the ABA, the National
Association of Women Judges, and even our newly formed Washingtonbased Administrative Law Inn of Court. We have much to learn from each
other.
But now for a minute to descend from the macro to the micro. Even
without any increases in responsibility, the ALJs' findings and reasoning
already dominate the administrative law process. They are the starting
point for the rest of us. I recognize, of course, that the Supreme Court told
article III courts a long time ago that they do not directly review an AU's
findings, but rather must focus on the agency's decision. 9 In doing so,
however, reviewing judges are allowed and indeed instructed to take into
account the ALl's findings as part of the overall mix of data from which
the court must decide whether or not "substantial evidence" supports the
agency's decision. 10 And on the court of appeals we do try conscientiously
to adhere to that mandate.
As you know, many of our administrative law cases involve complex
facts and highly technical subject matters. While we have the duty to
familiarize ourselves with the subject matter of each case we considerno matter how arcane-so that we can make responsible judgments as to
whether an agency acted within reasonable bounds, the volume of our
business necessitates taking shortcuts. Up there in our ivory tower, we
have limited expertise and resources to absorb, synthesize, and accommodate all of the facts and evidence presented by parties throughout the
adversarial process. Even if we immerse ourselves ad infinitum and ad
nauseam in the technical details of the record, a practice of which I have
often been accused, still we are often left groping for the more elusive,
intuitive grasp of the essence of a case. Over time we have developed a
number of doctrinal devices to deal with our inherent limitations: we say
we police the consistency and procedural regularity of agency decisionmaking, and that we require an explanation for any departure from past
policies of the agency; we insist on being able to discern the path of the
decisionmaker, insuring, as Judge Harold Leventhal has said, that she does
12
not cross the line from the "tolerably terse" to the "intolerably mute";

9 See, e.g., FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358 (1955); Universal
Cimera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 492-97 (1951). See generally K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 17.16 (2d ed. 1980).
10

Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 496-97.

11 Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841,851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
12 Id. at 852.
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and we take a "hard look" to assure that 13the agency has adequately
considered all the relevant factors in a case.
But most often the best initial hold a reviewing court can get on the
case as a whole comes from the findings and opinion of the AL. The
ALJ's decision cannot of course be determinative on review, but it often
provides the most dispassionate voice in the record. When I first came
onto the court of appeals, Malcolm Wilkey, then my senior by ten years,
told me that in an agency case I should go first to the AU opinion, then
to the agency decision, then, in the remaining time, to the briefs. And that
was, in the main, good advice.
Areviewing court will generally use the ALT's recommended decision
as the benchmark for its first impression on agency reasonableness. If an
agency affirms the AU's findings, there arises an informal presumption
of normalcy in the proceedings. But a reviewing court's antenna picks it
up immediately when the agency has reversed or overridden in substantial
part the AIL's decision, particularly findings of fact. It is simply a fact of
administrative life that when two primary decisionmakers disagree, a
reviewing court will be especially careful to find out why, whereas when
the agency head affirms the AL's decision, the challenger has a very
heavy burden to bear. When there is disagreement, some of us, especially
those who have worked elsewhere in government, may harbor a scintilla
of suspicion that the politically appointed top level policymakers in an
agency are more likely caught up in the pursuit of the agency's current
mission or immediate goals than the AL at the bottom of the process who
listens to the evidence. I think we give you, the AU, our closest attention
in most such cases. Of course, the agency always has the last word on
policy, and its interpretation of statutory law, if reasonable, will prevail
when we do not think Congress has spoken to the precise issue. But when
your board or commission finds the facts differently from you, we
generally apply something of a strict scrutiny standard. Some courts of
appeals have come right out and said it: when an agency departs from an
14
AI's findings, "it must explain why."'
I recently conducted an informal survey of administrative law opinions
handed down by the D.C. Circuit in the first several months of 1988 in
cases that had originated before ALJs. Having involved only twenty-four
cases, my analysis did not rise to the level of "statistical significance;"
still, it confirmed my general impression of how important a role ALJs'
13 See, e.g., Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 520 &
n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (borrowing Judge Leventhal's phrase to suggest that we must "take a
'hard look' at both the facts and the agency's reasoning" (citation omitted)). See also
Leventhal, EnvironmentalDecisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev.
509,514 (1974) ("The court does not make the ultimate decision, but it insists that the agency
take a 'hard look' at all relevant factors.")
14 ITT Continental Baking Co. v. FTC, 532 F.2d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 1976).
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work plays in the review process. First of all, as I went looking for how
the court treats ALs' findings, I was struck by the matter-of-factness with
which courts and agencies alike rely on the ALJs' factfindings as determinative in the overwhelming majority of cases. But even beyond the
factual determinations, the reviewing bodies most often fell in line with
the AI.'s overall legal analysis: in two-thirds of the cases that reached
our court for review, both the agency and the court affirmed the AL's
decision. 15 Perhaps most interesting, of the six cases where the agency
disagreed with the AU's recommended decision, 16 the court set aside the
agency action in all but two. 17 That says something!
A closer look at a few of the cases in the sample reveals home of the
dynamics that go on between the appellate courts, the ALJs, and the
agency middle man. When you base your findings clearly on the
credibility or demeanor of witnesses, you are at your zenith of power, even
when there are conflicting stories. In one recent case, we said: "We must
accept the ALJ's credibility determinations, as adopted by the Board,
unless they are patently insupportable."' 18 And in only one case out of
twenty-four did we find an ALJ's findings "inherently incredible." 19 But
a word of advice: when you are basing your findings on the credibility of
witnesses, it is wise to say so. If you do not clearly identify the source of
your findings, there is much more room for interpretation by a reviewing
agency or court as to whether your ultimate findings were indeed secondary or derivative or inferential, and not based on witness credibility. If
they are perceived as secondary or inferential, and the agency subsequently overrules you, there is a greater chance we will go along with
the agency, as indeed we did in one case in my sample. 2° However, even
that case produced a spirited dissent on our court citing the "ill-conceived,
21
ill-reasoned reversal of [the] Administrative Law Judge."
With remedies as well, because they are seen as partaking more of
policy judgments, we are likely to give the agency the benefit of the doubt
if it adopts a remedy different from that selected by an AIJ. And, of course,
15 See, e.g., Comuni-Centre Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 856 F.2d 1551 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1539 (1989); Simpson v. Young, 854 F.2d 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
United Food and Coninercial Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 852 F.2d 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Boilermakers Local No. 374 v. NLRB, 852 F.2d 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
16 See G.W.Galloway Co. v. NLRB, 856 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Drexel Burnham
Lambert, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 850 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Chirino v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 849 F.2d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Dart v. United States,
848 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Simpson v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Comm'n,
842 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Leeward Auto Wreckers, Inc. v. NLRB, 841 F.2d 1143 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
17 See Drexel, 850 F.2d at 753; Chirino,849 F.2d at 1530-31.
18 NLRB v. Creative Food Design Ltd., 852 F.2d 1295, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
19 Chirino v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 849 F.2d 1525,1530 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
20 Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 850 F.2d 742

(D.C. Cir. 1988).
21

Id. at 756 (Starr, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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if the AL or the agency uses the wrong legal standard in a decision, we
will reverse and remand. Customary deference notwithstanding, in
several cases where the agency had overturned the ALT, our court literally
scoured the record, only to conclude ultimately that the board did not have
substantial evidence for overturning the ALT's findings. In one case, the
court said that the basis of the board's mistake lay in some confusing
"dictum" by the ALT. The message there, I suppose, is to keep your
findings crisp and clean.
And, finally, I would note that your factfinding power is sometimes
downright scary. In a recent disability case, an ALT denied benefits to a
claimant who alleged that stress originating in work conditions caused his
heart attack.23 Despite a long series of cases upholding benefits in workstress-related heart attack cases, the court stuck with the ALl's finding,
that work-related stress had not caused this
over conflicting testimony,
24
particular attack.
Because of the importance of your factfinding at all subsequent stages,
I view with some interest recent debates about how detailed or sparse AL
opinions should be.2 5 From my viewpoint an opinion by an AL can and
should do more than merely lay out the bare minimum of findings
necessary to reach the legal conclusion in a given dispute. The AU's
opinion is the reviewing court's first introduction to the case, and it should,
therefore, spell out essentially everything the reviewing court needs to
know. Thus, while like motherhood and apple pie, we all favor administrative as well as judicial succinctness, an overly terse ALT opinion has lost
sight of its audience.
You are writing for judicial readers down the road who may not and,
in fact, probably will not, read for themselves all the testimony you have
heard. ALJs thus need to lay out for us not only the critical findings, but
the basis on which they have made them, even spoonfeeding us the record
cites for the most important findings. You need to distinguish between the
primary findings based on witnesses or documents and the secondary
inferences you draw from those sources. You need to draw us a map of
how both your primary and secondary findings lead you to your conclusions of law, and what legal standards you are applying to the facts.
Very often we end up reviewing an ALT's opinion directly when the
agency adopts it as its own. Thus, the more explicit the connections you
draw between facts and law, the easier you make our job. A rough count
22

Simpson v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 842 F.2d 453, 461

(D.C. Cir. 1988).
23 Whitmore v. AFIA Worldwide Insurance, 837 F.2d 513 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
24 Id at 516.
25 For an articulate argument that AU opinions should become "very sparse," freeing
AUs to "leapfrog [from facts] to the conclusions of law," see the remarks of the Hon. Jean
F. Green. Greene, Keppel & Gelpe, Fact-FindingandOpinion WritingforAdmninistrative
Law Judges, 4 Law and Inequality 91, 94 (1986).
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of our recent agency remands reveals that in approximately half the cases,
the cause of the remand was the court's inability to understand or accept
the decisionmaker's path of reasoning. We did not say that they were
wrong, only that we could not figure out how they got from here to there.
"Failure to adequately explicate" is the term of art used for our inability
to figure out what an agency was doing or where it was going. Instead of
spending so much time moot-courting the agency lawyers who come into
court to argue for decisions already made, I think more agency resources
ought to be spent in moot-courting the rationales and decisions themselves. I am not sure how this would work with ALs, but I know that with
article IlI judges, one's colleagues often succeed in picking up inconsistencies and gaps in one's reasoning or clarity that may produce confusion
if left uncorrected. Many remands could be avoided by some comparable
internal review process at all stages of agency decisionmaking. You may
sometimes forget it, but we are generalists up here with limited capacities.
As individual judges we sit on only a dozen or so cases from any given
agency each year. In most instances, we need an extensive education as
to what the case is all about. Conversely, we are also ornery critters who
do not always react well if we think someone is trying to overwhelm us
with jargon and complex concepts. Having a colleague read a proposed
decision can often help this entire process along.
I hope that I have not bored you with the obvious. In a nutshell, and
without idle flattery, you are probably the most critical part of the
administrative process. If you get it right, the rest goes smoothly, almost
automatically. If you do not, there are apt to be "searching reviews,"
remands, and inefficient repeats of the process. We on the court of appeals
always look carefully-and usually first-at what you do; your work is
never wasted or ignored, believe me. But in a more basic sense, we also
look for you to do the right thing-to provide the non-mission oriented
appraisal of the case for us to consider. In some agencies that takes great
courage. But if you don't take that first principled step, you cut off our
options up the line. Yours is a hard job, but an essential one if citizens are
to retain their faith in a fair government and if our two branches of
government are to work together in harmony. I know you are up to the
job, and I wish you well.

Query
X, intent upon murdering V, puts poison in V's
canteen before V sets out on a trek across the
desert. Y, also intent upon murdering V, and unaware of X's act, punches a hole in V's canteen.
V goes into the desert and dies of thirst. Who, if
anyone, murdered V?

